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AN INQUIRY INTO THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN
RESPONDENTS' PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND
JUVENILE COURT DISPOSITIONS"
CHARLES W. THOMAS*
W. ANTHONY FITCH**
The sentencing stage in criminal cases has been the subject of in-
creasing attention during the past several years in court decisions,' rules
of criminal procedure, and professional literature. The reasons for this
concern are undoubtedly numerous, but certainly include the continuing
dissatisfaction with current methods and results of incarceration and
other correctional alternatives,4 the related concern with the deprivation
t Research for this article was supported by the National Institute of Law Enforce-
ment and Criminal Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, grants
#73-NI-03-0002 and #75-NI-99-0031. Financial support from NILECJ does not neces-
sarily indicate the concurrence of the Institute in any of the statements or conclusions
in this article.
* B.S., McMurry College; M.A., University of Kentucky; Ph.D., University of Ken-
tucky. Associate Professor of Sociology, Bowling Green State University.
** A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Harvard University; M.A., University of New
York, Albany.
1. See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois,
399 U.S. 235 (1970); Spechr v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
2. After years of debate, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have been amended
to allow defense counsel, in most cases, to review the presentence report. FED. R. CRiM.
P. 32(c) (3). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32, Advisory Committee Note.
3. See, e.g., ABA, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING
TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (Approved Draft 1968); ABA, PROJECT ON STAND-
ARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PRO-
CEDURES (Approved Draft 1971); R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE,
LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE (1969); M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW
WITHOUT ORDER (1973); R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 125-205 (1973); Co-
burn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 207
(1971); Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to the Con-
cept of Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463 (1974); Weigel, Appellate Revision of
Sentences: To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 STAN. L. REV. 405 (1968); Syrn-
posiunz-ABA Minimon Standards for Criminal Justice, 33 LA. L. REV. 541, 559-68 (1973);
Comment, Appellate Review of Sentences: A Survey, 17 ST. Louis U.LJ. 221 (1972);
Current Development, Appellate Review of Sentencing: A New Dialogue, 45 U. Cow.
L. REV. 209 (1973); Dubose, Book Review, 65 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 122 (1974).
4. See generally R. CARTER, R. McGEE & E. NELSON, CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA (1975);
R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA (1970); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974);
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CoRRFa-
TIONS (1973); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
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of various constitutional rights of prisoners,5 and the growing interest in
discretionary decisionmaking at all stages of the criminal justice
process.' This last perspective-analysis of the exercise of discretion
which the legislative branch has delegated either implicitly 7 or express-
ly" to the other branches of government responsible for administering
the criminal justice system-underlies the research reported in this article.
The issue of "discretion" in the criminal justice system, including its
identification, role, and control, is perhaps most sharply presented in
the juvenile court process. The early proponents of the "child-saving"
JUSTICE, TASK FORcE REPORT: CORRECTIONS (1967); CORRECTIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROS-
PECrs (D. Petersen & C. Thomas eds. 1975).
5. See, e.g., Wolff v. Mcdonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319
(1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249
(1971); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Younger v. Gilmore, 319
F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 15 (1971). Chief Judge Friendly has
recently alluded to the "violent upswing in complaints by state prisoners attacking the
conditions of their confinement." H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw
104 (1973). See also R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, supra note 3, at 359-526; H. KERPER & J.
KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED (1974).
6. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (2d ed. 1971) is the seminal work in this area.
Other leading articles dealing with various aspects of the criminal justice process in-
clude: Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1971); Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcemwent, 27 U. CHI.
L. REV. 427 (1960); Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEXAS L.
REV. 703 (1974); Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police
Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123 (1967); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the
Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REv. 904 (1962); Kaplan, The Prosecu-
torial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 (1965); Kuh, Plea Bargaining:
Guidelines for the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 48 (1975);
LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law (pts. 1-2), 1962 WIs. L. REV. 104,
179; McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MicH. L. REV. 659 (1972); Remington
& Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481;
White, A Proposal for Refornz of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439
(1971); Contemporary Studies Project: Administrative Control of Police Discretion, 58
IOWA L. REv. 892 (1973); Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Crit-
inal Complaints, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 519 (1969).
7. State criminal codes commonly provide little or no guidance to police or prosecutors
regarding the innumerable discretionary decisions which they must make daily. See
generally sources cited note 6 supra.
8. In contrast to policing and prosecutorial decisions, sentencing is expressly assigned
by state codes to the judge or the jury. In both instances sentencing discretion is at
least somewhat confined within the broad range of statutorily-established minima and
maxima. Beyond these rudimentary restraints, sentencing discretion is as uncharted and
unstructured as discretionary decisions at other stages of the criminal justice process.
See generally M. FRANKEL, supra note 3.
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movement argued that the juvenile court system would serve two basic
purposes: the provision of child-oriented social services to troubled
children and the protection of these children from the harsher sanctions
available to the criminal courts.' It was thought that informal procedures
and the exercise of the broadest discretion were necessary to avoid
frightening or stigmatizing children and to select treatment regimens
responsive to each child's needs.'0 Accordingly, formal pretrial'- and
trial' 2 procedures were relaxed at juvenile hearings.
Recent Supreme Court decisions, although requiring greater regularity
and formality in the juvenile justice process, 3 have not significantly
narrowed the exercise of discretion in the juvenile system. Indeed, the
Court has stressed that the procedural protections imposed by
these decisions apply only to the adjudicatory stage.14 Decisionmak-
ing in the nonadjudicatory stages remains unchanged in concept and,
apparently, in operation as well.'5 The police continue to screen chil-
9. See A. PLATr, THE CHILD-SAVERS: ThE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 46-74 (1969);
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 107, 109, 114 (1909).
10. Mack, supra note 9, at 121.
11. Unlike the adult criminal justice system, juvenile courts do not normally con-
duct postarrest, pretrial hearings to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that a child has committed a delinquent act and should therefore be subject to
adjudication. See, e.g., M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. App. 1971).
12. "[T]he ordinary legal evidence in a criminal court is not the sort of evidence to
be heard in [a juvenile] proceeding .... The ordinary trappings of the courtroom are
out of place in such hearings." Mack, supra note 9, at 120. It was not until In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967) that the Supreme Court held that alleged juvenile delinquents, like
adult criminal defendants, were constitutionally entitled to receive written notice of
charges, to be represented by counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to
refrain from incriminating themselves. More recently, the Court held that juveniles are
not constitutionally entitled to have their cases heard by a jury, citing as one reason the
fear that, if required, the jury trial would "put an effective end to what has become the
idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding." McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
13. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(child charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult can
be found delinquent only upon evidence establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (procedure by which a juvenile
may be transferred from the juvenile court to the criminal court for trial as an adult).
14. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
15. Cf. Chused, The Juvenile Court Process: A Study of Three New Jersey Coun-
ties, 26 RUTGERs L. REV. 488 (1973); Dufee & Siegel, The Organization Man: Legal
Counsel in the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 544 (1971); Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitel-
baum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its Implenentation, 3 LAW & SocY REv.
491 (1969); Reasons, Gault: Procedural Change and Substantive Effect, 16 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 163 (1970).
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dren to an even greater degree than they do adults; 6 decisions not to
take children into custody or, if custody has been temporarily assumed,
not to refer them to juvenile court have become so institutionalized that
some police departments maintain rather elaborate records of both types
of decisions.'7 Additional measures such as "informal probation" or
"police probation" are also used to divert juveniles from the judicial sys-
tem.'8 Further, the peculiar juvenile court "intake stage" combines legal
and nonlegal, as well as "prosecutorial-type" and "sentencing-type," de-
cisions,' 9 reinforcing the tradition of discretionary, individual processing
of children in trouble at still another prehearing stage of the system.
Whatever its virtues and defects, the juvenile justice system differs
significantly from its adult counterpart in its express incorporation of
highly differential processing of alleged delinquents. The separate juve-
nile court system emerged from a pervasive belief that the goal of re-
habilitation best could be served by permitting juvenile courts to maxi-
mize flexibility, informality, and discretion, especially at the dispositional
or sentencing stage.2 0 Thus, the dispositional alternatives available to the
juvenile court are extremely broad." Like its adult counterpart, how-
16. See generally A. CIRCOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1968);
N. GOLDMAN, THE DIFFERENTIAL SELECTION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS FOR COURT APPEAR-
ANCE (1963); Black & Reiss, Police Control of Juveniles, 35 AMER. SOCIOLOGICAL REV.
63 (1970); McEachern & Bauzer, Factors Related to Disposition in Juvenile Police Con-
tacts, in JUVENILE GANGS IN CONTExT 148 (M. Klein ed. 1967); Piliavin & Briar, Police
Encounters 'with Juveniles, 70 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 206 (1964); Werthman & Piliavin,
Gang Members and the Police, in THE POLICE: Six SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS 56 (D. Bordua
ed. 1967); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized
Justice, 79 HARv. L. REV. 775 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Juvenile Delinquents].
17. juvenile Delinquents, supra note 16, at 784-85.
18. See id. at 783-84.
19. See Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, Separating Official and Unofficial Delinquents:
Juvenile Court Intake, 55 IOwA L. REV. 864, 869-74 (1970); Sheridan, Juvenile Court
Intake, 2 J. FAMILY L. 139, 148-51 (1962); Terry, The Screening of Juvenile Offenders,
58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 173 (1967); Thomas & Sieverdes, Juvenile Court Intake: An
Analysis of Discretionary Decision-Making, 12 CRIMINOLOGY 413 (1975); Note, In-
fornal Disposition of Delinquency Cases: Survey and Comparison of Court Delegation
of Decision-Making, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 258, 279-82.
20. For a general discussion, see R. CARDWELL & J. BLACK, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
186-249 (1971).
21. Thus, under appropriate circumstances, a juvenile court in Virginia, for example,
may place a juvenile offender on probation, leave the child at home under custody of
the courts, impose a fine of up to $100, impose restitution or reparations, commit the
child to a public welfare institution, foster home, or corrections institute, separate the
child permanently from his parents, or waive jurisdiction and commit the juvenile to the
adult criminal system. VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-178 (Repl. Vol. 1975). See ARIZ. REV.
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ever, the juvenile court system has been criticized strongly in
recent years. The informality and lack of standards at all stages of
the system, the largely uncontrolled, nonr.eviewable discretionary power
of juvenile court officials, 22 and the vaguely worded "status offender"
statutes23 still in effect in many jurisdictions24 have caused courts and
STAT. ANN. § 8-241 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 37, § 705-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-61 (Supp. 1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-286 (Cum. Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-321 to 323
(Cum. Supp. 1976).
22. One factor influencing the Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), was
that the petitioner faced maximum confinement of six years for the offense of making
an obscene telephone call, while the maximum sanction on an adult for the identical
offense was a $5 to $50 fine or imprisonment for not longer than two months. Id. at
29. The same danger inheres in state codes which provide for indeterminate commit-
ment and do not restrict institutionalization to more serious offenses. See statutes cited
note 21 supra.
23. A status offense is an act which if committed by an adult would not be char-
acterized as a crime, but nonetheless subjects a child to the jurisdiction of a juvenile
court. Board of Directors, NCCD, Jurisdiction over Status Offenses Should Be Re-
moved from the Juvenile Court: A Policy Statement, 21 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 97
(1975). Status offenses include waywardness, truancy, consensual sexual behavior, smok-
ing, curfew violation, disobeying authority, and ungovernability. Id. Recent criticisms
of this aspect of the juvenile court's jurisdiction include: PREsIoENT's COMMISSION ON
LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOcIETY 81, 85 (1967); PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssION O, LAw ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
mINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CRIME 7-27 (1967); Board of Directors, NCCD, supra; Note, Ungovernability: The
Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383 (1974); Note, Juvenile Court Statutes-Are
They Void for Vagueness?, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOCIAL CHANG E 39 (1974); Comment,
"Delinquent Child": A Ternn Without Meaning, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 352 (1969).
24. In Virginia, for example, juvenile courts have jurisdiction over any child:
(f) Whose occupation, behavior, environment, condition, association, habits
or practices are injurious to his welfare;
(g) Who deserts or is a fugitive from his home, or who is habitually disobe-
dient or beyond the control of his parents or other custodian, or is incorri-
gible;
(h) Who being required by law or his parents or custodian to attend school
is a willful and habitual truant therefrom;
(j) Whose condition or situation is alleged to be such that his welfare de-
mands adjudication as to his disposition, control and custody ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158(1) (Rep]. Vol. 1975). See IND. ANN. STAT. §3 31-5-7-4,
31-5-7-7 (1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570 (Supp. 1975); MICH. Comsp. LAWS ANN.
§ 712A.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-1103 (9), 15-1171 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
Even recently revised delinquency statutes in many states permit juvenile courts to
retain jurisdiction over status offenders by the creation of a new category of offender.
See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-1203(13),'10-1026 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (juvenile
in need of supervision); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.022, 2151.23 (A) (1) (Page Supp.
1974) (unruly child). Several states have attempted to reduce the coverage of their
1975]
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commentators to charge that juvenile court operations deprive many
children of constitutional rights25 without demonstrating any greater
measure of rehabilitation than is achieved by adult criminal courts in
which such rights are more fully protected. 26
The amorphous structure and procedures of juvenile courts have led
many behavioral scientists to examine whether officials in the juvenile
system consider children's personal characteristics and other extralegal
factors in a manner disadvantageous to certain segments of the popula-
tion. These inquiries focused upon the effect of factors such as
ethnic origin, sex, demeanor, socioeconomic status, and family situation
on the decisionmaking of probation officers, who prepare disposition re-
ports and recommendations, and judges, who render the final dispositions
in formally adjudicated cases. The effects of such personal characteris-
tics on the outcome of adjudications were contrasted to the influence of
more objective factors, such as the nature of the offense committed by
the children and their prior record of involvement in delinquency. 27
Because the findings contained in this body of research are highly in-
consistent,28 neither the advocates nor the critics of the unstructured dis-
positional authority of contemporary juvenile courts can boast a solid
empirical basis for their positions. 9 In part, this inconsistency results
from differences between the various localities in which research has
been conducted; thus, those concerned with the possibility of improper
decisionmaking at the dispositional stage of juvenile court processing
should examine the relevant data with respect to the particular locality,
and, concomitantly, should avoid generalizing the results of research to
other potentially disparate localities. Accordingly, this article examines
the extent to which various personal characteristics of offenders affected
the disposition of juvenile court cases in one Virginia area between 1966
and 1973. The article is also intended to serve as an example of the way
that behavioral scientists, using contemporary methods of empirical re-
search, can contribute to the resolution of difficult legal issues on which
reliable data are all too frequently lacking.
juvenile code. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-2, 705-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102, 50-103 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
25. See notes 12-13 supra.
26. See, e.g, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-31 (1967).
27. See, e.g., Chused, supra note 15; Terry, supra note 19; Thornberry, Race, Socio-
economic Status and Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 90 (1973).
28. See, e.g., notes 30-54 infra & accompanying text.
29. See note 55 infra & accompanying text.
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Prior Research
Upon initial examination, those critical of the continuing absence of
an effective integration of criminological theory, behavioral science
research, and the law may be discouraged by the disparity between
the theory and reality of the decisionmaking processes at any level
of the criminal justice system. Previous work that directly or in-
directly attempted to provide a paradigm that would account for non-
offense-related variations in juvenile court dispositions, such as the cur-
rently popular labeling paradigm, 30 hypothesized that numerous variables
were associated with judicial decisions. In general, this body of literature
suggested that, unless effectively precluded by the structure of the judi-
cial decisionmaking process, case dispositions would tend to reflect the
preferences of those in positions of power and to discriminate against
those who, for legally irrelevant reasons, lacked the requisite level of
social, economic, and political power that might otherwise inhibit their
being treated harshly."
Attempts to verify such conceptual models through empirical evidence
gathered from studies of the decision to arrest,32 the determination of
court intake officers to refer juveniles for a formal hearing, 33 and
30. Concisely stated, the labeling approach to deviant behavior (also referred to as
the societal reaction and interactionist approach) contends that "deviant behavior is
less a function of a person's overt acts than an interpretation and definition of those
acts by others." Rushing, Individual Resources, Societal Reaction, and Hospital Com-
mitmfent, 77 AM. J. SocIoLoGY 511 (1971). See 1. TAYLOR, P. WALTON & J. YOUNG, THE
NEW CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE 140-44 (1973). The labeling
paradigm has become the most significant contemporary development in the sociology
of deviance. Although the model has been associated with the position advanced in
F. TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND THE CO.MMUNITY (1938), the best contemporary state-
ments of the approach include E. SCHUR, LABELING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR (1971); 1. TAYLOR,
P. WALTON & J. YOUNG, supra; R. HAWKIN S & G. TIEDEMAN, THE CREATION OF DEVI-
ANCE: INTERPERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS (1975). Critical evaluations
of the model are provided by the above authors as well as by Akers, Problems in the
Sociology of Deviance: Social Definitions and Behavior, 46 SOCIL FORCES 455 (1968);
Gibbs, Issues in Defining Deviant Behavior, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEVIANCE
(R. Scott & J. Douglas eds. 1972).
31. T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1966); E. SCHUR, Supra
note 30; A. TURK, CRIMINALITY AND LEGAL ORDER (1969); Chiricos, Jackson & Waldo,
Inequality in the Imposition of a Criminal Label, 19 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 553 (1972); Rush-
ing, supra note 30; Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOCIAL PROB-
LEMS 133 (1962).
32. See, e.g., sources cited note 16 supra.
33. See, e.g., Arnold, Race and Ethnicity Relative to Other Factors in Juvenile Court
Dispositions, 77 AMER. J. SOCIOLOGY 211 (1971); Ferster & Courtless, The Intake Proc-
ess in the Affluent County Juvenile Court, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1127 (1971); Terry, supra
note 19; Thomas & Sieverdes, supra note 19.
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actual court decisions ' have resulted in remarkably inconsistent findings
concerning the influence on juvenile court dispositions of hypothetically
significant personal characteristics. As one research team noted in a study
of juvenile court referrals, "even a superficial review of the relevant
literature leaves one with the rather uncomfortable feeling that the only
consistent finding of prior research is that there are no consistencies in
the determinants of the decision-making process." 35
A similar difficulty confronts those who undertake an examination of
judicial decisionmaking at the dispositional stage. Studies examining the
relationship between ethnicity and case disposition, for example, various-
ly report no relationship, 6 relatively more severe treatment of blacks,3 7
and harsher treatment of whites .3  Evaluations of the importance of
socioeconomic status alternately have shown that juveniles from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds are more severely sanctioned 9 and that
socioeconomic status is largely irrelevant.40 Although home stability
generally has been thought a poor predictor of case disposition, 41 at least
two researchers have found that juveniles from broken homes receive
more serious dispositions.42 Likewise, while many studies have observed
that girls tend to be more harshly treated than boys if their cases are
referred for a formal hearing, 43 there is also evidence to the contrary.4
There are, however, consistent findings that juveniles not enrolled in
school are more harshly disposed of than those enrolled at the time of
their hearing.45
It should also be noted that certain potentially meaningful variables
34. See notes 36-64 infra & accompanying text.
35. Thomas & Sieverdes, supra note 19, at 416.
36. Ferdinand & Luchterhand, Inner-City Youth, the Police, the Juvenile Court, and
Justice, 17 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 510, 521-22 (1970); Terry, supra note 19, at 177-79.
37. Arnold, supra note 33, at 217-26; Thornberry, supra note 27, at 93-98.
38. Scarpitti & Stephenson, Juvenile Court Dispositions: Factors in the Decision-
making Process, 17 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 142, 148 (1971). See also Ferster & Court-
less, Pre-dispositional Data, Role of Counsel and Decisions in a Juvenile Court, 7 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 195, 211-12 (1972).
39. C. Sieverdes, Differential Disposition of Juvenile Offenders: A Study of Juvenile
Court Labeling, 1973 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Mississippi State University);
Scarpitti & Stephenson, supra note 38, at 145-46; Thornberry, supra note 27, at 96-98.
40. Arnold, supra note 33, at 218; Terry, supra note 19, at 177-80.
41. See Arnold, supra note 33; Ferdinand & Luchterhand, supra note 36, at 522; Scar-
pitti & Stephenson, supra note 38, at 146.
42. C. Sieverdes, supra note 39; Chused, supra note 15, at 528.
43. Chused, supra note 15, at 528, 529; Terry, supra note 19, at 178.
44. C. Sieverdes, supra note 39.
45. C. Sieverdes, supra note 39; Scarpitti & Stephenson, supra note 38, at 146.
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such as the identity and preferences of the complainant,46 the imposition
of pretrial detention,47 the presence of counsel,48 the juvenile's de-
meanor in court,4 9 and the characteristics of the judge hearing the
case5" have been the subject of little research. The available evidence
suggests that these factors significantly influence dispositions in both
juvenile and adult courts; again, however, there are discrepant findings.5'
Only very preliminary attempts have been made to link these variations
to other factors which might explain the differences."2 Similarly,
some initial attempts have been made to relate the source of complaint to
case dispositions. For example, two independent studies have noted a
tendency for complaints filed by parents to terminate in harsh disposi-
tions, 5 3 while a third has reported contrary results.54
Several reasons can be suggested for this volume of conflicting evi-
dence. One of the more obvious is that important characteristics of juve-
nile court systems vary between jurisdictions. The statutory and pro-
cedural constraints, as well as the community expectations, under which
courts operate, the organizational structure of the courts, and the quality,
training, academic background, and social perspective of staff members
will influence dispositions. A recent study of three New Jersey coun-
ties, for example, revealed considerable variation in the influences on the
decisionmaking process among the courts studied.55 Furthermore, some
of the available literature does not allow the relative importance of social
factors to be determined because of the absence or inadequacy of con-
trols for such basic variables as the seriousness of the offense and the
46. See Black & Reiss, supra note 16, at 74-75.
47. See, e.g., Chused, supra note 15, at 526-27, 534, 598, 600, 601.
48. See, e.g., Chused, supra note 15, at 526, 584-85; Ferster & Courtless, supra note 38,
at 206-09, 214, 219; Susman, Juvenile,'Justice: Even-handed or Many-handed?, 19 CRINM
& DELINQUENcY 493, 502 (1973).
49. See A. CIRCOUREL, supra note 16; Black & Reiss, supra note 16, at 74-75; Ferdinand
& Luchterhand, supra note 36, at 516-18; Piliavin & Briar, supra note 16, at 210; Werthman
& Piliavin, supra note 16, at 74.
50. See Gauder, Tbe Differences Between Judges in the Granting of Sentences of
Probation, 19 Tmp. L.Q. 493 (1973); Gaudet, Harris & St. John, Individual Differences
in Penitentiary Sentences Given by Different Judges, 18 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 675
(1934); Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 333
(1962); Susman, supra note 48, at 504, 505.
51. As to the effect of the judge and the presence of counsel, compare Susman, supra
note 48, with Ferster & Courtless, supra note 38, at 206, 214.
52. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 50; Susman, supra note 48.
53. Chused, supra note 15, at 523, 531, 602; Ferster & Courtless, supra note 38, at 212,
213.
54. Terry, supra note 19, at 175 & n.16, 177-78.
55. Chused, supra note 15, at 504-615.
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child's prior offense records. 56 Finally, there is considerable varia-
tion in the manner in which the crucially important disposition
variable has been defined. Terry employed a dichotomy of formal
supervision and commitment; 57 Arnold contrasted commitment to non-
commitment;58 and Thornberry compared the proportion of offenders
placed on probation with the proportion institutionalized.59 Thus, in ad-
dition to the problem of inadequate comparative data, basic methodolog-
ical differences continue to hamper the accumulation of a body of reli-
able information in this area.
In short, previous research has provided only inconsistent clues as to
the influence of personal characteristics on the disposition of juvenile
offenders. Even a direct comparison of the sophisticated research of
Terry'" and of Thornberry6' reveals contradictory evidence.6 2  Sig-
nificantly, the available research on the determinants of police decision-
making and on the decision of probation or intake officers to refer a
case for a formal court hearing reveals similarly inconsistent findings
with regard to the relative importance of personal characteristics.63
Given such a body of literature, any hypothesis about the extent to which
personal attributes of offenders alter the probability and severity of judi-
cial decisions must be considered extremely speculative."
56. See, e.g, Scarpitti & Stephenson, supra note 38.
57. Terry, supra note 19, at 176.
58. Arnold, supra note 33, at 211.
59. Thornberry, supra note 27, at 93.
60. Terry, supra note 19.
61. Thornberry, supra note 27.
62. While Terry found no significant relationship between the severity of the dis-
position and race and socioeconomic status, Terry, supra note 19, at 174-80, Thornberry
found the converse. Thornberry, supra note 27, at 93-98.
63. For example, while Terry, supra note 19, at 177, found that race was not a factor
in police dispositions, Thomas & Sieverdes, supra note 19, at 425-29, reached a contrary
result.
64. The emphasis of this study on inconsistent and contradictory findings with re-
spect to the association between personal factors and case dispositions should not be
taken to mean that more objective factors have consistently been found to be good
predictors. Positive relationships have generally been noted between seriousness of
offense and severity of sanctions, but there are exceptions. Compare Ferdinand &
Luchterhand, supra note 36, at 521; Scarpitti & Stephenson, supra note 38, at 148; Terry,
supra note 19, at 177-79; Thornberry, supra note 27, at 94-95, 97-98; with Ferster &
Courtless, supra note 38, at 212-13; Lerman, Child Convicts, TRANSACTMON, July-Aug.
1971, at 35. Review of the literature reveals that only one factor-prior offense record-
is a consistent predictor of juvenile court judges' decisionmaking. See, e.g., Chused,
supra note 15, at 526, 527, 600, 603; Ferster & Courtless, supra note 38, at 213; Scarpitti
& Stephenson, supra note 38, at 149; Terry, supra note 19, at 177-79; Thornberry, supra
note 27, at 94, 97, 98.
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Research and Methodology
Data for the analysis which follows were taken from juvenile court
records in one of the standard metropolitan statistical areas6 5 in Virginia.
Although a review of cases processed between January 1, 1966, and July
31, 1973, yielded a sample of 1,522 juveniles who had come before the
court one or more times during that time period, only those juveniles
for whom relatively complete social background information was avail-
able were chosen for inclusion in the sample. This nonrandom sampling
procedure provided a disproportionately large number of juveniles who
had been referred to court for comparatively serious offenses or because
of histories of previous delinquent involvement, but the bias introduced
into the study by this anomaly should be minimal because both serious-
ness of the offense and prior offense record were held constant in the
analysis.
The court records in this sample were reviewed to obtain data on the
source of complaint, the nature of the offense, the judge who heard the
case, the judicial disposition, and the prior record, socioeconomic status,
ethnicity, home situation, and school enrollment of the juvenile. These
data were then subdivided to enable more precise analysis. Offenses
were divided into felonies, misdemeanors, or status offenses, as defined in
the Virginia Code. 6 Prior offenses were trichotomized, juveniles with
no prior offenses constituting one group, those with one prior offense a
second group, and those with more than one prior offense the third
group. Socioeconomic status was determined on the basis of the occupa-
tional prestige of the juvenile's father (or mother, if there was no male
head of the household). The four categories of this variable included
professionals, managers, white collar and sales workers, and blue collar
and unskilled workers. The home situation variable included four cate-
gories: both father and mother present in the home, one natural parent
and one stepparent in the home, father or mother present, and neither
father nor mother present. Complaints were coded as having been in-
65. A standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA), a term defined by the United
States Bureau of the Census, is a "county or group of contiguous counties which
contain at least one city of 50,000 inhabitants or more, or 'twin cities' with a combined
population of at least 50,000. In addition to the county, or counties, containing such a
city or cities, contiguous counties are included in the SMSA if, according to certain
criteria, they are socially and economically integrated with the central city .... In the
New England States, SMSA's consist of towns and cities instead of counties." 1 UNITED
STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS FOR STATES, CITIES, AND CoUN-
nEs, UNITED STATES SUMMARY, pt. 1, at App-3 (1972).
66. See VA. CODE AN.-. §5 16.1-158, 18.2-8 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
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itiated by the juvenile's parents, other private citizens, social service
agencies and school officials, or the police. Finally, the dispositional al-
ternatives were grouped into dismissals, continuances or dispositions that
called for fines or required restitution to the victim, probation, suspended
sentences, and institutional commitments.
Analysis and Findings
Prior research has shown that a variety of personal characteristics, as
well as the gravity of the offense and the juvenile's previous record, are
associated with both the type and the severity of juvenile court case
dispositions. 7 Some research at the dispositional stage, however, has
found that the relevance of presumably significant personal attributes,
particularly race and socioeconomic status, is considerably diminished
when objective factors, such as the type of offense and the prior record
of the juvenile, are held constant;-" this has generally been interpreted
to be a function of the statistical interaction that has been noted between
the two groups of variables. 9 Other studies have found a statistically
significant association between personal factors and dispositions even
67. See notes 36-41 supra & accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 19.
69. Establishing a correlation between two variables does not demonstrate that they
are causally related to one another. At least two additional types of evidence are
essential for causal arguments: temporal order (the cause must occur prior in time to
the effect), and the absence of spuriousness (the demonstration that variables other
than the independent variable under consideration did not produce the observed effect).
To cite a nonsense example that illustrates the point quite well, we can demonstrate
that the number of ministers ordained in the United States each year is highly corre-
lated with the number of gallons of rum produced in Puerto Rico and that increases in
the production of ministers (the independent variable) occurs prior to the increased
output of rum (the dependent variable). Are we to conclude that ministers drive the
population to drink? Perhaps, but a more direct interpretation is that population in-
crease, an unexamined variable, causes a demand for both more ministers and more
rum. The initial relationship is spurious. In the context of the substantive issue being
addressed in this paper, some of the prior researchers have suggested that race
and socioeconomic status are correlated with offense type; offense type is, in turn,
correlated with type of case disposition. If race or socioeconomic status is corre-
lated with disposition without the biasing effect of offense type being removed, a corre-
lation may be discovered that is not "real." Instead, it is only a statistical artifact pro-
duced by the association between the independent variables, race and socioeconomic
status, and an unexamined variable, offense type. This type of problem makes it
essential that those unfamiliar with statistical techniques exercise extreme caution in
their interpretation of the types of empirical articles that are appearing with increasing
frequency in the legal literature. For an excellent and nontechnical introduction to
the problems of analyzing and interpreting data, see T. HIRsCHI & H. SELvIN, DELIN-
QUENCY RESEARCH (1967).
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when type of offense and prior record are held constant.7° The purpose
of the analysis of this study is to remove the complicating effect of both
offense type and prior record in order to obtain a more accurate assess-
ment of the relevance of personal characteristics in the dispositional
process in the standard metropolitan statistical area under study.
The initial step is to determine which variables are associated with
each of various dispositions when the type of offense and offense record
are not held constant. The pertinent findings of this aspect of the analysis
are summarized in the correlation matrix7' presented in table 1. The table
TABLE 1
INTERCORRELATION MATRIX (CRAMER'S C) OF VARIABLES
X1  X9  X3  X4  X5  X6  X7  X8 X9  X1 0
X 1  1.000 .118 .096 .185 .074 .089 .177 .159 .275 .202
X 2  1.000 .045* .047* .065* .038* .337 .077 .050* .429
X 3  1.000 .059* .217 .336 .102 .106 .091 .091
X 4  1.000 .097 .061* .068* .054* .135 .142
X 5  1.000 .136 .081 .056* .025* .054*
X 6  1.000 .052* .075 .063* .040*
X7  1.000 .135 .202 .507
X 1.0OO .080 .002*
x9 1.000 .098
X10  1.000
X1 = Disposition X6 = Socioeconomic Status
X 2 = Sex X7 = Complainant
X 3 = Race X8 = Judge
X4 = School Enrollment X9 = Prior Offense Record
X 5 = Home Situation X, 0= Offense Type
*Indicates coefficients that are not significant at or less than the .05 significance level.
shows that, with the exception of the very weak (but still statistically
significant) association between race, socioeconomic status, and disposi-
70. See, e.g., Thornberry, supra note 27.
71. A correlation matrix provides information on the level of association found be-
tween each variable and every other variable under consideration. Such a matrix
provides an initial illustration of how closely a set of independent variables are associated
with the major dependent variable (case disposition), and also reveals how closely the
independent variables are correlated with one another. This alerts the analyst to any
interactions between general categories of independent variables that need to be taken
into consideration in more carefully controlled segments of the analysis. See note 69
supra.
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don, the results of this study are generally consistent with the pre-
ponderance of earlier research.7 2 Ranked .from highest to lowest level of
association, the ordering of the predictor variables was prior offense
record (C - .275), type of offense (C = .202), school status (C - .185),
complainant (C = .177), which judge heard the case (C .159), sex
(C = .118), race (C = .096), socioeconomic status (C = .089), and
home situation (C - .074).73
These associations suggest that although objective and personal factors
are taken into consideration, the objective factors are more closely as-
sociated with dispositions. More significant, however, is the inconsistency
of those linkages when the distributions within the tables which yielded
these associations are closely examined. Limitations of space preclude the
presentation of each of the relevant contingency tables,7 4 but the gen-
eral implication that can be drawn from them is that the disproportionate
representation of those sharing any given trait at one point along the
continuum of severity of case disposition does not necessarily, or even
typically, mean that there will be a similar imbalance at any other point
along that continuum. This, in turn, strongly suggests that previous re-
search, which either treated case disposition as a dichotomy or applied
72. See notes 36-54 supra & accompanying text.
73. Cramer's C (sometimes referred to as Cramer's V), the measure of association
employed in this analysis, is but one of several measures of association that are based
on the X2 (chi-square) test. X2 is a measure of the extent to which the distribution
of cases in a contingency table that is composed of c columns and r rows differs from
the distribution that would be predicted on the basis of simple probability computa-
tions if we assumed that the two variables were statistically independent of one an-
other. For example, a computed X2 statistically significant at the .01 significant level
indicates that the distribution under examination only would be expected to occur purely
by chance I out of 100 times; in other words, the variables would appear to be linked
with one another in a manner not attributable to pure chance. This statistic, however,
does not provide any information on the degree of association that exists between the
variables under consideration. Measures of the type provided by Cramer's C are there-
fore necessary. This measure of association, unlike the more familiar Pearsonian corre-
lation coefficient and a variety of other frequently employed measures, has a lower
limit of zero and an upper limit of 1.0 rather than ranging between a -1.0 (perfect
inverse correlation) and a +1.0 (perfect direct correlation). It does, however, provide
a useful means of comparing variations in the magnitude of association that exists be-
tween, for example, a series of independent variables and a dependent variable. The
higher the value of C, the more closely an independent and a dependent variable are
linked with one another. As indicated previously, however, the mere presence of a
high level of correlation, even a perfect correlation of 1.0, does not mean that the
variables are causally related. See note 69 supra.
74. For a nontechnical discussion of what a contingency table is and how such
crosstabulation tables provide a meaningful tool for behavioral science researchers, see
N. NiE, SPSS: STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 218-248 (2d ed. 1975).
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statistical measures which assume additive linear relationships among the
variables under examination, may have produced very misleading in-
terpretations of the manner in which both personal and objective factors
affect decisionmaking.
This inconsistent pattern was observed in virtually every relationship
between the predictor variables and case disposition. For example, those
in the highest and lowest socioeconomic groups were equally represented
(34.9 percent of each group) when the sanction imposed was something
less serious than probation, but juveniles in the lowest socioeconomic
status group were considerably more likely to be committed to a juve-
nile corrections institution than were those from the highest group (22.0
percent to 14.3 percent). Similarly, while males and females were al-
most equally likely to be committed (16.5 percent to 16.7 percent),
males were more likely to receive a suspended sentence than were females
(10.2 percent to 3.5 percent). In addition, there was a tendency for
those who shared a common characteristic to receive more lenient dis-
positions than other groups at one point along the seriousness continuum
while being treated less leniently than those groups at another point
along this continuum. Two examples will illustrate this seeming paradox.
First, the black juveniles in the sample were both more likely to have
their cases dismissed than were whites (12.2 percent to 8.6 percent) and
more likely to be committed for their offenses (27.1 percent to 13.9
percent). Likewise, and surprisingly, juveniles with multiple prior of-
fenses had charges against them dismissed far more frequently than those
with no prior offenses (23.6 percent to only 3.1 percent), but they also
were committed more often than their first-offense counterparts (28.5
percent to 8.8 percent).
Several possible explanations of these findings, all meriting further
exploration, present themselves at this level of analysis. First, it should
be noted that the levels of association between both objective and per-
sonal variables and case dispositions are of weak to moderate magnitude,
suggesting that no single factor exerts a major independent influence on
judicial decisionmaking. Given the philosophy of the juvenile court sys-
tem, this might be interpreted as a positive finding, for it may indicate
consideration of a broad spectrum of variables during the dispositional
process in an effort to individualize the decision. The same data give
rise to another possible, though quite dissimilar, interpretation: that some
who share given personal characteristics will be treated in a significantly
different fashion from others drawn from different segments of the popu-
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lation. Thus, juveniles against whom complaints are filed by one type of
complainant are perhaps being treated in a different manner from others
who have engaged in comparable behavior but whose offense has been
brought to the attention of social control agencies by a different com-
plainant; or, perhaps those who come before one judge are receiving
different dispositions than those who appear before another judge regard-
less of who they are or what their present and past offense record might
be. These latter points could not be resolved without conducting a more
controlled analysis, and it is to this end that the remainder of this study
is directed.
Tables 2 and 3 provide a summary of the multivariate analysis ob-
tained from the data collected for this study."5 This aspect of the analysis
is designed to determine whether personal characteristics exert a sig-
nificant effect on judicial decisionmaking when the potentially compli-
cating influences of offense type and prior record are alternately held
constant. Table 2 shows the results obtained when seriousness of offense
is held constant; table 3 demonstrates the consequences of controlling for
prior offense record. If the initial associations between personal attributes
and dispositions were mere artifacts of the statistical interaction between
the personal and objective factors, 6 the levels of association between the
personal factors and case dispositions would be expected to be reduced
greatly, if not altogether eliminated, when the influence of the objective
factors is removed. On the other hand, if the personal characteristics
have an impact on case dispositions that is independent of the objective
factors, the relationships observed between the personal factors and case
disposition in table 1 should not be affected significantly.
The findings of the multivariate analysis presented in table 2 are par-
ticularly interesting for two reasons. First, in no instance was it found
that the introduction of a control for the type of offense eliminated the
relationship between the personal factors and case disposition. On the
contrary, a substantial number of the associations became even stronger
75. A bivariate analysis would present the association between an independent variable
and a dependent variable without any other variable being taken into consideration.
As indicated above, however, it is almost always necessary to go beyond a bivariate
analysis to allow a focus on additional variables. See note 69 supra. In tables 2 and 3
this is achieved by examining the association between personal characteristics and case
disposition while holding type of offense and prior offense record constant. This yields
a set of conditional associations, the associations between an independent and a depend-
ent variable under each category of a control variable, and effectively removes the
potential biasing influence of the third variable.
76. See note 69 supra.
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TABLE 2
CONDITIONAL ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PERSONAL AND OTHER
FACTORS AND CASE DISPOSITION WHEN OFFENSE TYPE
IS HELD CONSTANT
Independent
Variable
Sex
Dependent Variable:
Case Disposition
Race
School Enrollment
Home Situation
Socioeconomic
Status
Complainant
Judge
Original Offense
Correlation Type
.118 Felony
Misdemeanor
Status Offense
.096 Felony
Misdemeanor
Status Offense
.185 Felony
Misdemeanor
Status Offense
.074 Felony
Misdemeanor
Status Offense
.089 Felony
Misdemeanor
Status Offense
.177 Felony
Misdemeanor
Status Offense
.159 Felony
Misdemeanor
Status Offense
than had been noted previously. Secondly, and even more importantly,
an examination of the tables themselves reveals a tendency away from
the inconsistent disposition patterns described above. Within each cate-
gory of offense, males were treated more harshly than females, blacks
more harshly than whites, school dropouts more harshly than those who
were enrolled in school at the time of their court appearance, and those
from broken homes more harshly than those with stable home environ-
ments. In other words, when the type of offense was held constant,
judges appeared to impose sanctions upon those who shared particular
characteristics more consistently than was the case when type of offense
was not controlled.
The results obtained with the other personal variables are not as
straightforward. For example, juveniles with lower socioeconomic back-
Conditional
Correlation
.107
.117
.106
.166
.102
.148
.248
.224
.134
.132
.118
.124
.132
.111
.111
.106
.103
.129
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grounds tended to receive stiffer sanctions for felonies or status
offenses, but when the offense was a misdemeanor, all socioeconomic
categories were dealt with in a more equitable fashion.77 The significance
of the complainant variable depended upon the type of offense. The
vast majority of felony complaints came from the police (86.6 percent)
and the frequencies observed for other sources of complaints were too
small to be meaningful. At the other end of the spectrum of offenses, the
situation changed considerably. Status offense complaints received from
parents or guardians were disposed of more harshly than those received
from other sources. Finally, the differential sentencing preferences of
the three juvenile court judges who litigated the preponderance of the
cases in the sample should be noted. One judge, for example, tended to
dismiss the petition (25.0 percent) or to assign either suspended or actual
commitment sentences (30.8 percent) in felony cases; the other two
judges most frequently deemed probation to be appropriate for felony
offenders (29.6 and 26.1 percent, respectively).
In short, the introduction of control upon the variable of offense type
generally produced a more interpretable, consistent set of relationships
between the personal factors under examination and case disposition.
The slight variation noted in the linkage of socioeconomic status with
disposition does not appear to alter this trend significantly. The con-
tinuing inconsistency with regard to the complainant variable can be ex-
plained by the strong association between offense type and source of
complaint (C = .507). The discrepant reactions of the judges, although
important, are difficult to interpret because the data do not include
any information on the characteristics of the judges before whom the
sample of juveniles appeared.
The introduction of prior offense record as a control presents one
methodological problem that was not so pronounced when offense type
was held constant. Most of those in the sample (55.83 percent) had no
prior record in the area from which the data were obtained, despite the
fact that the selection procedures yielded a disproportionately large
number of juveniles with relatively serious records of delinquent be-
havior. Moreover, only 11.90 percent had multiple prior offenses, as
contrasted to the 37.27 percent who had only one prior offense recorded.
It follows that, because the dependent variable includes five dispositional
categories, these findings must be interpreted with care, especially when
77. It should be noted, however, that juveniles from higher socioeconomic back-
grounds were most likely to be placed on probation for such offenses.
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examining the associations between personal factors and disposition
among the cases which involved juveniles with more than one previous
offense.
TABLE 3
CONDITIONAL ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PERSONAL AND OTHER
FACTORS AND CASE DISPOSITION WHEN PRIOR RECORD
IS HELD CONSTANT
Independent
Variable
Sex
Dependent Variable:
Case Disposition
Race
School Enrollment
Home Situation
Socioeconomic
Status
Complainant
Judge
Original Prior
Correlation Offense
.118 None
One
Two or More
.096 None
One
Two or More
.185 None
One
Two or More
.074 None
One
Two or More
.089 None
One
Two or More
.177 None
One
Two or More
.159 None
One
Two or More
The findings summarized in table 3 show that in only 1 of 21 situa-
tions shown in table 3 did the introduction of control on the prior of-
fense record eliminate a relationship shown in table 1. This indicates that
the initial linkages of personal factors with disposition were not merely
a function of the association of personal factors and disposition with
prior offense record. Indeed, as was true when the gravity of the offense
was introduced as a control, by holding prior offense record constant a
number of conditional relationships emerged more clearly.
Unlike the results obtained by analyzing the influence of the gravity
of the offense, holding the prior record constant did not system-
Conditional
Correlation
.162
.132
.045
.138
.061
.109
.245
.163
.214
19751
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
atically eliminate the inconsistent disposition patterns shown by the un-
controlled correlation of type of dispositions to other personal variables.
Girls with no prior record were more likely to receive light sanctions or
to have their cases dismissed than their male counterparts, whereas girls
with one prior offense were most likely to receive light or harsh punish-
ment. The sex of the offender was shown to be largely irrelevant in
determining the case disposition of those with multiple prior offenses.
Juveniles from single-parent or totally broken homes were more likely
to receive serious sanctions when they had no prior record, and to be
confined when they had one prior offense, than their counterparts from
stable, intact homes. Similarly, the relevance of socioeconomic status ap-
parently diminished as the number of prior offenses increased. On the
other hand, the influence of race and school enrollment showed a con-
sistent pattern, particularly when the relative probabilities of confinement
are compared. Regardless of the number of prior offenses, blacks and
school dropouts were considerably more likely to face confinement for
their offenses than were whites and those attending school.
With regard to the influence of factors other than personal character-
istics of the juveniles, the findings become difficult to interpret when
prior offense record was held constant. The only consistent trend in the
association between complainant and disposition was that citizen-in-
itiated complaints uniformly resulted in less harsh dispositions than all
other types of complaints. The typical sanction applied to citizen-initi-
ated complaints was a continuance of the case. Complaints initiated by
social service agencies and schools culminated in generally moderate dis-
positions regardless of the number of prior offenses. The difference be-
tween reactions to parentally-initiated complaints and those coming from
the police is explained by the more frequent confinement of the juvenile
when the complaint was filed by a parent; this difference, however,
diminished when the juvenile had more than one prior offense.
The relationship between the judge before whom the case was heard
and case disposition was somewhat erratic under the three prior record
conditions. In general, the judges were hesitant to severely sanction
juveniles with no prior offense record (only 8.7 percent of our sample
faced commitment when they had no prior offense record) and inclined
to apply harsh sanctions to those with relatively long records (28.5 per-
cent of the juveniles with more than one offense were committed). In-
terestingly, the greatest disparity among the judges occurred in situations
[Vol. 17:61
JUVENILE COURT DISPOSITIONS
where the juvenile had one prior offense. For example, one judge com-
mitted only 4.7 percent of those juveniles who had only one prior of-
fense on record although he committed 26.1 percent of those with
multiple prior offenses, while a colleague committed 31.1 percent of those
wit4 one prior offense and 33.7 percent of those with multiple prior
offenses.
Notwithstanding the inconsistent disposition patterns observed in some
instances, it is clear that personal factors continue to exhibit an influence
on judicial dispositions of juvenile offenders when the effect of their
prior offense record is controlled, just as they do when the nature of the
present offense is held constant.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of the relationship between a juvenile's per-
sonal characteristics and the disposition of his case in one metropolitan
juvenile court system was prompted by three considerations. First, ad-
vocates of the present informal, flexible model for juvenile court opera-
tions argue that it is only within such a setting that the individualized
treatment of young offenders can be achieved. They claim that attempts
to structure the disposition stage or to circumscribe! juvenile court judges'
discretion will endanger the rehabilitative goal of the juvenile courts.
Critics, on the other hand, argue that the present system violates basic
principles of criminal jurisprudence and has not been shown to be truly
individualized or effective."8 Thus, this examination has attempted to
determine whether there is evidence that juvenile court dispositions sys-
tematically discriminate against particular segments of the population
and thereby undermine any true individualization of juvenile court sanc-
tions.
Secondly, important relationships may have been obscured in the previ-
ous literature by an absence of carefully controlled analysis, the selec-
tion of statistical measures of questionable utility given the nature of the
data being analyzed, and an operationalization of the case dis-
position variable as a dichotomy. This study has attempted to avoid
each of these problems to the fullest extent possible given the size of the
obtainable sample and the type of information that could be abstracted
from the official court records.
78. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); S. WHEELER & L. CoTrRELL, JuvE-
NILE DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL (1966).
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Finally, this analysis has attempted to examine the empirical adequacy
of that variant of labeling theory79 which holds that some segments of
the population, particularly those without access to political and eco-
nomic power, are more likely to receive harsh sanctions from social con-
trol agencies than other, more powerful segments. 0
As is often the case with any carefully conducted research, these find-
ings are difficult to evaluate because of the considerable lack of con-
sistency characterizing other research in this area. Nevertheless, the
general trends detectable from these data are basically consistent with
those reported by Thornberry,81 whose study was perhaps the most
carefully designed to date. Specifically, personal and social, as well as
objective, factors appear to influence case dispositions, but the levels of
association, while generally statistically significant, are of only low to
moderate magnitude. The relatively weak associations were not, how-
ever, eliminated when the potentially complicating influence of offense
type and prior record were held constant. This is not to say that the
pattern of influences found was completely consistent, particularly if the
disposition of only the small segment of the sample of cases involving
multiple offenders is examined. On the contrary, the data suggest that
the relevance of a juvenile's social background characteristics, the source
of the complaint filed against him, and the judge before whom a case
happens to be heard are less significant should the juvenile be referred to
court for a serious offense after having already appeared in court num-
erous times before. On the other hand, only 8.7 percent of the juveniles
in the sample were appearing in court for a felony offense with a multiple
prior offense record. For the vast majority of those on whom data were
obtained, the severity of the sanctions the juveniles received was partly
determined by who they were, who reported their behavior, and on
whose court docket their case happened to appear.
Individualized justice? Perhaps. Certainly some of the factors which
have been examined in this study may reasonably be considered more
proper determinants of juvenile court dispositions than others. But if
the findings demonstrate the presence of individualized juvenile justice,
79. See note 30 supra.
80. This latter point is particularly significant if the widely accepted hypothesis that
the imposition of sanctions, instead of inhibiting recidivism, frequently contributes to
future involvement in proscribed behavior. See R. HAwKINs & G. TiEDEMAN, supra note
30. This hypothesis has been criticized by a number of researchers. See, e.g., Tittle,
Deterrents or Labeling, 53 SocIAL FoRcEs 339 (1975).
81. Thornberry, supra note 27.
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it is of a strange variety that seems most typically to apply its harshest
sanctions to blacks, to those who have dropped out of school, to those
in single-parent or broken homes, to those against whom a complaint was
filed by a parent or a police officer, and to those from a lower socio-
economic background-to those, in other words, who are the least likely
in our society to have the ability or the power to deal effectively with
the juvenile court establishment.
